Synopsis

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF THE
SEA 1983-1984

This synopsis examines major events occurringbetween December,
1983, and December, 1984, that affect the law of the sea. It discusses military uses of the world's ocean space that impairedfree
and peaceful navigation of the world's seas in 1984, the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and related issues,

marine environment pollution, marine mammals, Antarctica, and
the St. Georges Bank controversy.

MILITARY IMPAIRMENT OF FREE NAVIGATION OF THE WORLD'S
OCEAN SPACE

Introduction

Military abuses of the world's ocean space occurred with frequency and intensity in 1984. The mining of Nicaraguan waters,'

the attacks on neutral ships in the Persian Gulf,2 and the mining of

the Red Sea s threatened and impaired free use of the world's seas by

innocent vessels in contravention of international law as embodied in
the recently adopted United Nations Convention on the Law of the

Sea (Convention) .4 These incidents of violent assault on non-belliger-

ent vessels by countries or organizations immersed in military and

political conflicts underline the failures of international law to main1. See infra notes 7-52 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 53-153 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 154-210 and accompanying text.
4. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, openedfor signature Dec.
10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 [hereinafter cited as 1982 Convention]. See especially art. 17 (which concerns the right of innocent passage in the territorial sea); art. 38
(which guarantees the right of transit passage through straits); art. 58(1) (which assures
freedom of navigation in the Exclusive Economic Zone of a nation); art. 87 (which covers
the right of free navigation on the high seas). Id.
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tain the peaceful stability of the world's ocean environment. 5 Moreover, these occurrences highlight the Convention's failure to address
meaningfully the significant issue of military interference with the
free navigation of neutral, innocent vessels on the world's seas. 6
Mining of Nicaraguan Waters
On February 25, 1984, two fishing vessels sank after apparently
hitting mines in the port of El Bluff near Bluefields, Nicaragua's.
largest Atlantic coast town. Nicaragua's Minister of Interior issued
warnings on March 4, 1984, that Nicaraguan rebels, aided by the
United States, would increase violence against economic targets. According to the minister, this violence would include the mining of
Nicaraguan ports, the most significant of which is Corinto, an important fuel-unloading facility on the Pacific Coast about ninety
miles northwest of Managua." During the first week of March, a
Dutch dredger struck a mine in the narrow approach channel to
Corinto and was severely damaged.9 A Panamanian ship hit a mine
the evening of March 7, 1984, and, at the time, appeared to be sinking. 10 It was, however, able to return to Corinto. 11 The 3500-ton
tanker had just left port "laden with exports which are life blood to
the beseiged Nicaraguan economy."'12 Later in March vessels from
the Soviet Union, Japan, and Liberia were damaged by mines
planted in Nicaraguan ports.13
In early April it was learned from reliable United States government sources that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was deeply
embroiled in the mining of Nicaraguan harbors and ports. According
to Reagan administration and congressional officials, this involvement included the presence of CIA-employed Americans supervising
the mining from a ship off Nicaragua's Pacific coast. 4 Americans
did not actually position the mines in the water; this job was per5. One of the articulated purposes of the Convention is to establish a "legal order for the seas and oceans . . . [that] will promote the peaceful uses of the seas and
oceans." 1982 Convention, supra note 4, preamble.
6. See A. PARDO, Opportunity Lost, LAW OF THE SEA: U.S. POLICY DILEMMA 13
(Oxman ed. 1983). In his article Dr. Pardo criticizes the Convention for not addressing
the "highly delicate" issue of "military uses of the marine environment." Id. at 18.
7. N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1984, at A3, col. 4.
8. The Times (London), Mar. 5, 1984, at 4, col. 5.
9. The Times (London), Mar. 7, 1984, at 7, col. 4-5.
10. N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1984, at A4, col. 4.
I!. The Times (London), Mar. 10, 1984, at 5, col. 2.
12. Id. These attacks on neutral vessels violate Art. 17 of the Convention. 1982
Convention, supra note 4, art. 17.
13. N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1984, at A4, col. 2. A Soviet oil tanker struck a mine in
the port of Puerto Sandino on March 20, 1984. London Times, Mar. 22, 1984, at 8, col.
7. Thus, evidence now existed that at least three major Nicaraguan ports, Corinto, El
Bluff, and Puerto Sandino, were mined.
14. N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1984, at Al, col. 6.
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formed by highly trained Latin American commandos who used
small, high-speed boats to penetrate shipping lanes near the shore.1 5
Because the ship on which the Americans worked never violated
Nicaragua's territorial waters, 16 unnamed intelligence officers asserted that the United States was not directly engaged in military
operations against Nicaragua, but instead only served in an advisory
17
capacity.
Although the mining of Nicaraguan waters began in late January
or early February of 1984, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence was not briefed on CIA involvement until March. 8 The House
Select Committee on Intelligence, however, was informed about the
United States and CIA entanglement in the mining in late January.' 9 President Reagan's approval of a recommendation from an interagency national security committee that called for the CIA to
plan and implement the mining of Nicaraguan harbors transpired at
some unknown date during December 1983.20 At a news conference
held on April 4, 1984, a reporter asked President Reagan if he was
concerned that mines planted in Nicaraguan harbors might be struck
by neutral freighters. The President refused to comment on "the tactics that are used in a war of that kind."' He responded forcefully
about the need to "inconvenience" Nicaragua in its effort to export
revolution to its neighboring country, El Salvador. 2
On April 6, 1984, while the full extent of CIA involvement was
still not publically known, Great Britain, one of the United States'
closest allies, harshly criticized the United States government for its
part in the mining of Nicaraguan waters as unwarranted interference with international shipping. The British government clearly disapproved of "any threat to the principle of freedom of navigation. 2 3
Another American ally, France, offered on April 5, 1984, to help
15. Id.
16. Nicaragua claims territorial waters up to 200 miles, but the United States
respects only a twelve mile limit. Id. The Convention permits each nation to establish a
territorial sea not to exceed the limit of twelve nautical miles. 1982 Convention, supra
note 4, art. 3.
17. N.Y. Times, April 8, 1984, at Al, col. 6. The CIA claimed this advisory
capacity was analagous to the role of Honduras-based Americans who train and help to
supervise rebel forces inside Nicaragua. Id.
18. N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1984, at A6, col. 4.
19. Id. at Al, col. 5.
20. N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1984, at A8, col. 5.
21. 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 479 (1984).
22. Id.
23. N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1984, at Al, col. 4. (quoting Andrew Burns, press counselor of the British Embassy).

Nicaragua clear its ports and harbors of mines.2 4 French Foreign
Minister, Claude Cheysson, labelled the mining of these ports "a
blockade undertaken in a time of peace against a '2small
country,
5
which presents a serious problem of political ethics.
A United Nations Security Council resolution condemning the
mining of Nicaraguan ports was vetoed by the United States on
April 4, 1984.26 Except for the United States and Great Britain,
which abstained, all members of the Security Council voted in favor
of the draft resolution that "[c]ondemns and callsfor an immediate
end to the mining of the main ports of Nicaragua, which has caused
the loss of Nicaraguan lives .. and the hampering of free navigation and commerce, thereby violating international law."'2 7 The Soviet Union and Nicaragua, both current members of the Security
Council, actively encouraged the drafting of the resolution and the
vote, which implicitly rebuked the United States for its involvement
in the mining.28
On April 6, 1984, the United States acted29 to preempt jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (sometimes referred to as
the World Court) in order to preclude Court hearing of an action
about to be brought by Nicaragua against the United States concerning American involvement in the mining of Nicaraguan
harbors. 30 The United States Secretary of State sent a letter to
Javier Perez de Cueller, Secretary General of the United Nations,
formally notifying the United Nations that it would not accept International Court of Justice jurisdiction in disputes involving Central
America for the next two years. 31 In this letter the United States
offered as a rationale for its two year suspension of Court jurisdiction the need "to foster the continuing regional dispute settlement
process which seeks a negotiated solution to the interrelated political,
economic, and security problems of Central America. ' 32 On April 9,
1984, Nicaragua filed an application with the Court instituting proceedings against the United States and charging the United States
24. N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1984, at A7, col. 1.
25. Id.
26. 23 I.L.M. 457, 669 (1984) (reproduced from U.N. Doc. S/16463 of Apr. 4,
1984).
27. Id.
28. N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1984, at A7, col. 1.
29. See infra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 43-52 and accompanying text.
31. Text of the letter provided by the United States Department of State, reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 457, 670 (1984). The International Court of Justice is the central
judicial organ of the United Nations. The Court has, however, no mechanism for implementing its judgments. It relies instead entirely on moral persuasion and the impact of
world opinion. In previous years, a number of nations, including France, Italy, West
Germany, and the Soviet Union, have refused to accept the Court's jurisdiction. N.Y.
Times, Apr. 9, 1984, at A8, col. 3-4.
32. 23 I.L.M., supra note 26, at 670.
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with engaging
in military and paramilitary activities against
33
Nicaragua.

The United States Senate adopted on April 10, 1984, by an
eighty-four to twelve vote, a non-binding resolution opposing the expenditure of federal funds to mine the harbors and ports of Nicaragua.3 4 The Senate resolution states in full: "It is the sense of Congress that no funds heretofore or hereafter appropriated in any act of
Congress shall be obligated or expended for the purpose of planning,
directing, executing or supporting the mining of the ports or territorial waters of Nicaragua."3
Two days following the passage of the Senate resolution, the
United States House of Representatives passed a similar non-binding
resolution, urging that no funds be used for the purpose of mining
the ports or territorial waters of Nicaragua. 6 The vote in the House,
281 to 111,37 coupled with the Senate resolution, virtually guaran-

teed an end to United States (CIA) involvement in the mining. 8
This overwhelmingly bipartisan vote was perceived by many observers to be an angry rebuke to President Reagan's policy of permitting
covert and direct CIA entanglement in the mining of Nicaraguan
waters.3 9
In April, as a result of the mining of Nicaragua's territorial waters, at least two shipping companies halted the sailing of their ships
into Nicaraguan ports.4 0 Their actions furnished tangible evidence
that the mining of Nicaraguan harbors was impeding free navigation
and interfering with innocent passage of vessels in Nicaragua's territorial waters. 41 Not until mid-April did a major group of antiSandinista rebels announce it would discontinue mining Nicaraguan
33. Id. at 488; see also N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1984, at Al, col. 6 and A8, col. 1-2.
The State Department, on the day the complaint was filed, asserted that the International Court of Justice lacked jurisdiction over any dispute between the United States
and Nicaragua because the letter mailed to the Secretary General on April 6, 1984,
prevented the Court from hearing the suit. Id. at Al, col. 6.
34. 130 CONG. REC. § 54205 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 1984).
35. Id.
36. 130 CONG. REc. H2878 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1984).
37. Id.
38. N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1984, at A4, col. 3.
39. N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1984, at Al, col. 6. Senate Membership was extremely
unhappy that its own Intelligence Committee was not adequately informed of CIA participation in the mining. The vote followed an acrimonious exchange between members of
the Intelligence Committee and William J. Casey, Director of the CIA. Id.
40. N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1984, at All, col. 1-6. The two companies were the
Hapag-Lloyd American, Inc., and the Grancolomiana New York, Inc. Id.
41. See 1982 Convention, supra note 4, art. 17.

ports.42
The International Court of Justice ruled unanimously (15-0) on
May 10, 1984, that "[t]he United States of America should immediately cease and refrain from any action restricting, blocking, or endangering access to or from Nicaraguan ports, and, in particular, the
laying of mines." 43 The Court decision came in the form of a provisional order granting Nicaragua's request for a preliminary restraining order. 4" By a vote of fourteen to one the Court also declared that Nicaragua's sovereignty and political independence
should be respected and not threatened by "any military or paramilitary activities which are prohibited by the principles of international
law."45
Although a significant portion of the Court's opinion discussed the
claim by the United States that the International Court of Justice
lacked jurisdiction to entertain Nicaragua's complaint,46 the Court
delivered its provisional decision without issuing a final ruling on the
merits of the jurisdictional question.4 7 It left unresolved the American contention that its April 6, 1984, letter effectively stripped the
Court of jurisdiction over the dispute. The United States maintained
that by its Declaration of August 14, 1946, in which it assented to
compulsory World Court jurisdiction, the United States reserved the
right to renounce Court jurisdiction if it took preemptive action
before the filing of any complaint against the United States. 48 Additionally, the World Court failed to rule on another United States
claim (made in a letter to the Court dated April 23, 1984) that Nicaragua never accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court because Nicaragua never formally ratified the Protocol of Signature of
the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. 49
42. The Times (London), Apr. 16, 1984, at 6, coT. 1. The halting of mining by the
largest rebel group, the Nicaraguan Democratic Force, was precipitated by the negative
reactions of the United States Congress and rebel fears that Congress would cut off aid
to the "contras" (the popular name for the anti-Sandinista rebels). Id.
43. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States of America), 1984 I.C.J. I (Provisional Order of May 10), reprintedin 23
I.L.M. 457, 468-77 (1984).
44. Id. at 477.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 471-74.
47. Id. at 477.
48. Id. at 471, see supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
49. 23 I.L.M. 457, 471 (1984). The Court cited two cases to support its decision
to issue a provisional order without making a final determination on the merits of the
jurisdictional question; see e.g., Fisheries Jurisdiction (U. K. v. Ice.), 1972 I.C.J. 17 (Interim Protection Order of Aug. 17, reprinted in 23 I.L.M. at 477). On October 8, 1984,
the International Court of Justice delayed an expected decision on the Nicaraguan complaint. Instead, the Court convened hearings to determine if it has jurisdiction over the
complaint. The World Court focused on the contention of the United States that the
Court lacks jurisdiction because Nicaragua never recognized its authority. Nicaragua
claims that its membership in the United Nations constitutes implicit recognition of the
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On November 26, 1984, the International Court of Justice ruled
fifteen to one that it had jurisdiction over the complaint brought by

Nicaragua against the United States.50 Having established its juris-

diction, the World Court voted unanimously to hear the case on its
merits; it rejected the argument of the United States that, even if it
had jurisdiction, the Court should refrain from deciding the case.5 1

Reagan administration officials responded to the decision of the
Court by intimating that the United States may be forced to boycott
further proceedings
of the International Court of Justice regarding
52
Nicaragua's suit.
Persian Gulf Shipping Attacks

During 1984 more than fifty neutral vessels were attacked in the
Persian Gulf.5 3 Throughout this period the Iran-Iraq war (now over
four years old) engendered a sustained threat to the free flow of international shipping in the Persian Gulf and through the Strait of

Hormuz. 4 The continued willingness of Iran and Iraq to strike at
neutral vessels55 within and beyond the so-called militarized zone illuminates unhappily the ease with which principles of international
law are flouted. 56 Failure of the Convention to adequately confront

authority of the World Court. L.A. Times, Oct. 9, 1984, at 12, col. 2. The United Nations Charter states: "[a]ll members of the United Nations are ipsofacto parties to the
Statute of the International Court of Justice." U.N. CHARTER art. 93, para. I.
50. N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1984, at Al, col. 6. Justice Schwebel of the United
States was the lone dissenting judge. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at A12, col. 4.
53. L.A. Times, Dec. 10, 1984, at A14, col. 1; see also N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1984,
at A12, col. 3.
54. See 1982 Convention, supra note 4, art. 38, 45. These articles delineate the
rights of transit passage and innocent passage through straits used for international navigation, one of which is the strategically critical Strait of Hormuz that connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the open sea. Keeping the Strait open for shipping
is of paramount importance to maintaining the free flow of crucial Middle Eastern oil to
the rest of the world. See RAMAGANI, THE PERSIAN GULF AND THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ
9-23 (1979) (which provides an astute analysis of the overall significance of the Strait of
Hormuz).
55. On Dec. 3, 1984, an Iranian warplane struck a Cypriot supertanker south of
Kharg Island, the Iranian main oil terminal. N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1984, at A12, col. 1-3.
On Dec. 26, 1984, Iranian warplanes attacked a Spanish tanker ten miles north of the
Shah Olam Shoals, which lies midway between Qatar and the Iranian island Lavan. The
tanker had taken on its oil cargo at Ras Tanurah, Saudi Arabia, and was leaving the
Persian Gulf bound for India when the bombing occurred. Persian Gulf shipping sources
reported that the attack constituted retaliation for Iraqi attacks on oil tankers near
Kharg Island over the previous three weeks. L.A. Times, Oct. 9, 1984, at 18, col. 5-6.
56. The Convention failed to address military matters because they are very sensitive. Pardo, supra note 6, at 18. "All military uses of the sea are relevant to the law of
the sea," stated Dr. Pardo. Conversation with Dr. Arvid Pardo, professor of international

military uses of world waterways must be evaluated in the broader
context of American inability57 to stop the attacks on neutral
vessels. 5a

In early February two Greek cargo ships were struck by Iraqi missiles in the Persian Gulf off Iran.59 Almost simultaneously, the Reagan administration developed contingency plans with Great Britain
for keeping the Strait of Hormuz open.60 Great Britain agreed with
the United States to form a convoy system to assure free navigation

of commercial tankers entering and leaving the Gulf, if, as it
threatened, Iran tried to block the Strait of Hormuz.6" The United

States and Britain were ready to use military ships to keep the Strait

open to international trade.62 But, because no real effort was made

by Iran to seal off the Strait,6" neither the United States nor Britain
was forced to activate any contingency plan for maintaining free access through the Strait.
On February 27, 1984, Iraq announced that it had begun a blockade of the Iranian main oil export terminal at Kharg Island (near
the head of the Persian Gulf) by attacking oil tankers berthed there
with air strikes.64 An Iraqi attack on a fifteen-ship convoy of vessels
heading for the Iranian port of Bandar Khomeini on March 1, 1984,
extensively damaged a British cargo ship that had to be abandoned., No lives were lost in the incident, 6 but the evidence that
Iraq was carrying out its threat to attack merchant ships approaching Iranian ports caused Lloyd's of London to double war-risk premiums for ships in the Persian Gulf. 7 Additionally, a Turkish vessel
relations and senior research fellow at the Institute for Marine and Coastal Studies, University of Southern California, in Los Angeles, Calif. (July 19, 1984).
57. Perhaps, the realities of politics among nations almost inevitably dictate the
failure of any international law or body to effectively provide for order in a world populated by highly volatile, individualistic nation-states (e.g., Iran and Iraq).
58. See supra notes 56-57.
59. The Times (London), Feb. 3, 1984, at 5, col. 2.
60. Id. at col. 1.Their plans involved sweeping for mines in the Strait of Hormuz.
See also The Times (London), Feb. 23, 1984, at 7, col. 7-8.
61. The Times (L,ndon), Feb. 3, 1984, at 5, col. 1.
62. Id. Japan, which gets 60-80% of its oil from the Persian Gulf, was unwilling
to participate in a military convoy system. Japanese firms are deeply involved in projects
in Iran and feared their involvement in such a system might jeopardize these projects. Id.
Accelerated fighting between Iran and Iraq during the month of February accentuated
the dependence of Japan on Mideast oil. N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1984, at A6, col. 1-6.
63. See infra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
64. N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1984, at Al, col. 5. Iraq at this time promised to sustain the blockade until Iran halted the war. Id.
65. The Times (London), Mar. 8, 1984, at 1, col. 1-2. Seven vessels were hit in
the attack. Id. The assault occurred within Iranian territorial waters. The Times
(London), Mar. 9, 1984, at 4, col. 5.
66. The Times (London), Mar. 9, 1984, at 4, col. 5.
67. Id. Due to the constant threat of attack, insurers declared 150 by 50 miles in
the northeast section of the Persian Gulf a "war risk area." The Times (London), Mar.
10, 1984, at 6, col. 6.
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was reportedly sunk in this same raid, while an Indian ship apparently suffered some damage.6 8
On March 8, 1984, the British government officially protested this
attack to the Iranian ambassador in London. 9 One British Parliament member noted a current United Nations resolution 70 calling
for a cease-fire between Iran and Iraq and for freedom of navigation
in international waters. He entreated Richard Luce, British Minister
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, to explain how the
United Nations could be made more effective.7 1 Luce was unable to
explain the inefficacy of the United Nations regarding this conflict
and could only state that neither Iran nor Iraq was willing to receive
a representative of the United Nations Secretary General. 2
Throughout March and most of April, commercial ships sailing
the Persian Gulf remained relatively free from attacks arising out of
the Iran-Iraq war. On March 27, 1984, however, a Greek oil tanker
southeast of the Strait of Hormuz was hit by a missile, apparently
fired from an Iraqi aircraft.73 This assault occurred outside the IranIraq militarized zone. 74 Moreover, on April 18, 1984, a Panamanian
75
tanker was struck by an Iraqi missile near Kharg Island.
Throughout a three-week period beginning April 25, 1984, Iraqi
and Iranian aircraft attacked five oil tankers in the Persian Gulf.76
Two Saudi Arabian tankers were hit by Iraqi attacks in an area of
the Gulf around Kharg Island that Iraq has labelled the "exclusion
zone." 7 7 The third attack on a Saudi tanker" came outside this "ex68. N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1984, at A8, col. 1.
69. The Times (London), Mar. 9, 1984, at 4, col. 5.
70. S.C. Res. 540, 38 U.N. SCOR (2493d mtg.) at 6, U.N. Doc. S/INF/39
(1983). Summary of the resolution reprinted in U.N. CHRONICLE, Jan. 1984, at 103 (s/
16092). Included in the resolution is a request for all nations "to respect the right of free
navigation and commerce in international waters," and "to refrain from any action that
might endanger peace and security as well as marine life in the Gulf region." Id.
71. The Times (London), Mar. 9, 1984, at 4, col. 6.
72. Id. In a prepared statement, Luce averred that the government was "working
vigorously with the international community" to bring an end to the "destructive conflict" between Iran and Iraq. Id.
73. N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1984, at A9, col. 5-6. United States Navy explosive experts defused the unexploded missile as it lay stuck in the hiull of the ship. At the time of
the assault, Iraq claimed to have attacked two naval targets southwest of the Iranian oil
terminal at Kharg Island. Both Navy Department spokesmen and an agent for the Greek
shipping line that owned the tanker denied that the Greek ship was anywhere near
Kharg Island. Id. If Iraq committed this strike, it was the only assault by Iraq reported
to have occurred in 1984 outside the Iran-Iraq militarized zone.
74. See infra note 77.
75. The Times (London), Apr. 18, 1984, at 1, col. 2.
76. N.Y. Times, May 17, 1984, at Al, col. 1.
77. Id. at A5, col. 1. The Iraqi government continued to warn tankers and

clusion zone," sixty miles north of the Saudi oil refining center at
Ras Tanura. 79 Reliable United States State Department officials disclosed that Iran was responsible,8" although Iran never admitted this
responsibility.
Iranian aircraft hit a Kuwaiti tanker on May 13, 1984, east of the
Saudi coast and outside the Iran-Iraq "war zone." ' One day later, a
second Kuwaiti tanker was struck by two unidentified, but apparently Iranian, rockets in this same area, as it was on its way back to
pick up crude oil from a Kuwaiti oil terminal. 82 These attacks
seemed to demonstrate wanton disrespect for the principles of inter-

national law that guarantee free and peaceful use of the world's
ocean space by innocent, neutral vessels.8 3
On May 16, 1984, it became public knowledge that prior to these
five attacks the United States offered to supply air cover to defend

Kuwaiti and Saudi tankers against Persian Gulf air attacks. 84 At a
May 22, 1984, news conference, President Reagan refused to specify

what steps the United States government was willing to take regarding assaults on commercial shipping in the Gulf.8 5 Nevertheless, the
President declared that neither the United States nor the western
world would permit the Strait86of Hormuz or the Persian Gulf to be
closed to international traffic.
The Arab League8 7 met on May 19, 1984, and, at the urging of
the Gulf Cooperation Council, 88 condemned the bombing of neutral
freighters to stay out of the "exclusion zone" that extends radially fifty miles around
Kharg Island. Any ship found within this zone was subject to attack by Iraq. These two
attacks occurred on April 25, 1984, and May 7, 1984. Id.
78. This tanker was jointly owned by the Mobil Oil Company of the United
States and a private Saudi Arabian company. Id.
79. Id. This May 16, 1984, attack on a Saudi tanker close to its own port and
outside the normal perimeter of the Iran-Iraq war zone precipitated a sharp rise in the
cost of marine insurance and a steep increase in the price of oil in the spot and futures
markets. Id. at A6, col. 1-2.
80. Id. at Al, col. 4.
81. Id. at A1, col. 1. The tanker carried oil bound for Britain. Id. This attack was
the first reported one by an Iranian aircraft. N.Y. Times, May 24, 1984, at A5, col. 1.
82. N.Y. Times, May 17, 1984, at Al, col. 1.
83. See 1982 Convention, supra note 4, at art. 301. Article 301 is entitled
"Peaceful uses of the sea." It states that nations should not use "force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations."
84. N.Y. Times, May 17, 1984, at Al, col. 4.
85. 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 748 (May 22, 1984).
86. Id. In a letter delivered on May 20, 1984, President Reagan asked King Fahd
of Saudi Arabia to permit the United States access to Saudi airstrips for American aircraft, if the United States decided to protect Persian Gulf shipping from attacks by Iran.
L.A. Times, May 22, 1984, at 11, col. 5.
87. The Arab League was formed in 1945 by Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon,
Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen. Joining later were Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Kuwait,
Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab
Emirates and South Yemen. I WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA 546 (1984).
88. The Gulf Cooperation Council has as members six countries: Bahrain, Jordan,
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ships in the Persian Gulf.8 9 The Arab League also agreed to refer
recent attacks on Kuwaiti and Saudi vessels to the United Nations
Security Council. 90 At a May 22, 1984, meeting, the Gulf Cooperation Council denounced "Iranian aggression," but refused to criticize
Iraq." This selective denunciation reflected the fact that, although
Iran attacked fewer commercial vessels than Iraq, Iran Struck at
targets far removed from the Iran-Iraq militarized zone.92
The United Nations Security Council convened a session on May
25, 1984, to discuss the assaults on shipping in the Persian Gulf.9 3
Six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council formally demanded
this meeting.94 The session focused almost entirely on Arab censures
of Iranian air strikes against neutral ships.9 5 No mention was made
of the Iraqi attacks.96 The Arab speakers noted that the Iranian air
attacks occurred in international
waters outside the war zones
97
claimed by either Iran or Iraq.
On May 26, 1984, Japanese shipowners stated that they would
stop sending their own oil tankers into the northern section of the
Persian Gulf.9 8 Japan would continue, however, to charter foreign

tankers to bring crude oil to Japan from the Gulf.9 Japanese shipping companies and maritime unions jointly announced the decision
to restrict tanker shipping in the Gulf. 00
By May 27, 1984, the number of oil tankers docked in ports just
Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. N.Y. Times, May 23,
1984, at A4, col. 1.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. L.A. Times, May 22, 1984, at 16, col. 1. For example, after the Gulf Cooperation Council meeting on May 24, 1984, following an Iraqi air assault on Kharg Island,
Iranian jets attacked a Liberian-registered tanker (chartered by Japan) in a section of
the Gulf near the Saudi port city of Jubail. This attack took place far from the Iran-Iraq
war zone. N.Y. Times, May 25, 1984, at Al, col. 1.
93. N.Y. Times, May 26, 1984, at A4, col. 1.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. During the debate, Arab speakers specifically mentioned the May 13, and
May 14, 1984, attacks on Kuwaiti ships and the May 16, 1984, attack on the Saudi ship.

Id.

98. N.Y. Times, May 27, 1984, at Al, col. 1. The decision was almost certainly
made after consultation with the Japanese government. The trade issue of oil is of singularly vital importance to Japan, since it has no oil of its own. Id. at A18, col. 4.
99. Id.
100. Id. The ban on Japanese shipping in the northern region of the Persian Gulf
may have been implemented at the insistence of the Japanese seamen's unions. See L.A.
Times, May 26, 1984, at 113, col. 3.

outside the Persian Gulf had increased dramatically from ten to
greater than sixty in a three-week period. 101 Even without an overt
blockade of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran, Iranian and Iraqi attacks
on commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf managed to succeed indirectly in limiting the free flow of neutral vessels through the Strait
and in the shipping lanes of the Gulf.10 2 In late May, one major
Swedish tanker operator recalled its vessels from the Gulf. 0 3 Moreover, on May 27, 1984, an American-based oil tanker company, controlled by Texaco and Standard Oil of California, barred its tankers
from the northern Persian Gulf. 04
Reagan administration officials announced on May 28, 1984,
United States plans to send 400 Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to
Saudi Arabia. 0 5 The missiles furnished support for the Saudis and
their allies in an effort to establish a protected zone for shipping
along the western coast of the Persian Gulf.10 6 Almost immediately,
Iran denounced American military intervention in the Persian
Gulf.'07 "If Americans are prepared to sink in the depths of the Persian Gulf for nothing, then let them come," said President Ali
Khomeini of Iran." 8
President Reagan, in an interview with foreign television correspondents on May 31, 1984, condemned Iranian attacks on commercial ships from neutral countries outside the war zone. 0 9 The President condoned Iraqi attacks on "shipping that was vital to Iran's
economy" because "in a time of war the enemy's commerce and
trade is a fair target.""10 Iran, however, had "gone beyond bounds"
when it attacked neutral ships that were doing business with thirdparty countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait."'
After failing to garner sufficient votes in the United Nations Security Council to censure Iran explicitly," 2 the Gulf Cooperation
Council pushed through on June 1, 1984, an Arab-sponsored Security Council resolution tactily condemning Iranian attacks on commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf." 3 Because the Arabs compro101. N.Y. Times, May 28, 1984, at A4, col. 5-6.
102. See 1982 Convention, supra note 4, art. 45. Article 45 provides for innocent
passage through straits used for international navigation.
103. N.Y. Times, May 28, 1984, at A4, col 1.
104. Id., col. 2.
105. N.Y. Times, May 29, 1984, at Al, col. 6.
106. Id.
107. N.Y. Times, May 30, 1984, at Al, col. 5.
108. Id.
109. Interview with Television Correspondents Representing Nations Attending
the London Economic Summit May 31, 1984, 20 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 794-95
(1984).
110. Id. at 794.
Il1.
Id. at 794-95.
112. The Times (London), May 31, 1984, at 6, col. 1-3.
113. N.Y. Times, June 2, 1984, at Al, col. 5.
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mised their demand that Iran specifically be named in the resolution,
the Council approved a text that condemns "attacks on commercial
114
ships in route to and from ports of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.1
Nevertheless, Iran is blamed for all such attacks by the Gulf Cooperation Council. 15
On June 2, 1984, Iran formally rejected this United Nations resolution.11 6 In a statement by the Iranian Foreign Minister, Iran declared that the Security Council action assured Persian Gulf instability and effectively approved future Iraqi attacks on Iranian
shipping."17 "It [the United Nations] is, therefore, directly responsible for the intensification of the crisis . . . ," stated the Foreign
Minister." 8
A June 3, 1984, Iraqi missile attack on a Turkish tanker set the
vessel ablaze"19 and caused the Turkish government to temporarily
halt sailing its tankers to the Iranian oil terminal at Kharg Island.120
This assault occurred barely forty-eight hours after the United Nations Security Council had passed the
resolution condemning air at2
tacks on ships in the Persian Gulf.' '
On June 10, 1984, a rocket fired from an unidentified plane, presumably Iranian, struck a Kuwaiti oil supertanker in the lower Persian Gulf. 22 This assault was the first to occur in the southern region of the Gulf since Iraq and Iran began attacks on neutral ships
earlier in 1984 as an outgrowth of the Iran-Iraq war. 23
While this was occurring, an emergency meeting of the six Gulf
Cooperation Council nations12 4 was being held to discuss the means
of maintaining the flow of oil through the Persian Gulf (Gulf). 125 At
the same time Saudi Arabia greatly expanded its territorial waters
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. N.Y. Times, June 3, 1984, at 6, col. 1-6.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. N.Y. Times, June 4, 1984, at Al, col. 5.
120. N.Y. Times, June 5, 1984, at A4, col. 6.
121. Id. The resolution was clearly directed at Iranian attacks on neutral ships.
See supra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
122. N.Y. Times, June 11, 1984, at A3, col. 1. Iran refused to confirm or deny its
attacks on neutral vessels. Nonetheless, it was generally known that Iran was responsible
for several attacks on shipping outside the Iraq-Iran war zone, and Iran warned several
times that, if it cannot safely export oil, no ships will have free and safe passage in the
Persian Gulf. Id.
123. Id.
124. See supra note 88.
125. See supra note 122.

by including ocean regions twelve miles off the Al Arabiyah Island,
in the middle of the Gulf and about seventy miles from the Saudi
coast. 126 Saudi Arabia evinced determination to protect oil tankers in
the Persian Gulf shipping lanes from Iranian air attacks.12
The first week in June, Iran introduced a new stop and search
zone -8 in and around the Strait of Hormuz, directly interfering with
the free and innocent passage of vessels.129 Before its announcement
of the stop and search zone, Iran boarded a Singapore-registered
cargo ship in the lower Gulf purportedly to search for weapons.130
The ship was far from the war zone defined by Iran and Iraq.'' This
action by Iran appeared to be a form of harassment designed to implement the Iranian policy of inconveniencing shipping throughout
the entire Persian Gulf as retaliation for Iraqi attacks on ships in
and around Kharg Island. 32
On June 15, 1984, a senior Iranian official announced a desire by
Iran to see the current moratorium on attacks against Iranian and
Iraqi border cities expanded to include shipping in the Persian
Gulf. 133 This moratorium was proposed by United Nations Secretary
General Javier Perez de Cuellar the first week of June.1 34 Initially
offering no response to this proposal, 35 Iraq eventually rejected the
Iranian call for the United Nations mediation."3
After a short lull in shipping attacks, Iraq resumed its assaults on
tankers in or near the Iranian Kharg Island oil terminal on June 24,
1984.'17 A Greek tanker was slightly damaged in one attack. 38 On
June 27, 1984, an Iraqi missile attack on a Swiss supertanker 3 9 resulted in the death of eight crewmen. 140 Subsequently, a South Korean tanker was set ablaze by an Iraqi missile attack in the Khor
Musa channel of the northern Persian Gulf.141 In apparent retalia126. N.Y. Times, June 12, 1984, at A12, col. 3-6.
127. Id.
128. Id. Iran tried this method to deal with what it called "hostile" shipping. The
zone was reported to have extended from Jask Peninsula in the Gulf of Oman to sea
lanes off the island of Abu Rusa. Id.
129. See supra note 102.
130. N.Y. Times, supra note 126.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. N.Y. Times, June 16, 1984, at 3, col. 3-6.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 3, col. 3. Because Iran controls the Shatt al Arab estuary, Iraqi oil
shipments through the Persian Gulf have been curtailed during the four-year war. Since
February, Iraq attacked ships sporadically yet regularly in an effort to stem the flow of
Iranian oil in the Gulf. Id. See also supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
136. L.A. Times, July 3, 1984, at 116, col. 6.
137. N.Y. Times, June 15, 1984, at Al, col. 3.
138. Id.
139. N.Y. Times, June 28, 1984, at A3, col. 1.
140. N.Y. Times, June 29, 1984, at A3, col. 1.
141. L.A. Times, July 3, 1984, at 116, col. 1-4. The ship was part of a seven vessel
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tion for these Iraqi attacks, Iranian missiles 42 damaged a Japaneseowned supertanker as it headed southward through the lower region
of the Gulf toward the Strait of Hormuz. 4" The tanker was hit
twice, but damage was so minimal that the ship was able to continue
en route to the Strait.4

On July 11, 1984, Kuwaiti Defense Minister Sheik Salim alSabah announced in Moscow that Kuwait had signed a 327 million
dollar arms agreement with the Soviet Union. 45 The arms purchase
was made to aid Kuwait in defending commercial shipping in the
Persian Gulf from Iranian attacks. 46 Because of close proximity to
Iraq and a position in the upper-half of the Persian Gulf, Kuwait is
extremely vulnerable to Iranian attacks on its oil tankers. 47
A one-month respite of Persian Gulf attacks on commercial shipping ended August 7, 1984, with an Iraqi assault on a Greek-owned

tanker south of Kharg Island.14 a In mid August assaults were made
49

against oil tankers sailing the southern section of the Persian Gulf.

According to reliable shipping sources, these two strikes were perpe-

trated by Iran. 50 One of these attacks set fire to the main tank of a
Panamanian-registered tanker as it sailed 100 miles east of Bahrain
in the southern part of the Gulf, but the fire was quickly
extinguished.'
From late August through December 1984, sporadic attacks on
commercial shipping continued to occur in the Persian Gulf.152 The
convoy; the Khor Musa Channel leads to the major Iranian trading port of Bandar
Khomeini. Id.
142. Iran consistently refuses to acknowledge its attacks on Gulf shipping, but reliable shipping sources said the attacks were almost certainly instigated by Iran. L.A.
Times, July 6, 1984, at I8, col. 6.
143. N.Y. Times, July 6, 1984, at A3, col. 4. The attacks occurred east of Qatar;
the tanker had just taken on oil at Saudi Arabia's oil terminal at Ras Tanura. L.A.
Times, July 6, 1984, at I8, col. 5.
144. N.Y. Times, July 6, 1984, at A3, col. 4.
145. N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1984, at A7, col. 1.
146. Id.
147. N.Y. Times, July 6, 1984, at A3, col. 6. The distance from Kuwait to the
Strait of Hormuz makes it impossible for oil tankers carrying Kuwaiti oil to make the
entire trip at night, protected by darkness. Id.
148. L.A. Times, Aug. 8, 1984, at 114, col. 2-3.
149. L.A. Times, Aug. 19, 1984, at 129, col. 1-4.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. A Cypriot tanker was attacked by Iraqi missiles and reportedly sunk in waters just south of Kharg Island on August 24, 1984. N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1984, at A4,
col. 1. A Greek-owned tanker was struck by an Iranian missile on August 27, 1984, in
the lower part of the gulf, apparently in retaliation for the August 24, 1984, Iraqi attack.
L.A. Times, Aug. 27, 1984, at 14, col. 4. On September 12, 1984, Iraq claimed to have

freedom of vessels to peacefully sail the seas of the world, arguably
the most important right to be guaranteed and protected by any

"law of the sea,"153 was egregiously impaired throughout most of
1984 in the Persian Gulf, and this right of free navigation continues
to be endangered. No United Nations mediation, International Court
of Justice decision, or action taken pursuant to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea treaty materialized to curtail
Iranian and Iraqi interference with nonbelligerent, neutral shipping
in the Persian Gulf.
Mining of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Suez
Between early July 154 and mid-August 1984, at least eighteen
commercial ships were damaged by explosions in the Red Sea and
the Gulf of Suez; these explosions were apparently caused by underwater mines.1 55 The last verified explosion took place on August 11,
1984, when a Polish ship struck an explosive device in the Red
Sea.156 This incident occurred between the Yemeni and Ethiopian
coasts, about 150 miles north of the seventeen-mile wide Bab el
Mandeb Strait.1 57 The location of explosions was concentrated in the
Gulf of Suez, at the northern end of the Red Sea near the Suez
Canal, and in a second area near the Bab el Mandeb Strait, 1200
miles south of the Gulf of Suez. 158 The Bab el Mandeb Strait connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden;15 9 it is the important gate-

way to the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, and Asia.1 60

destroyed four ships in a convoy near Bandar Khomeini in the northern reaches of the
Gulf. L.A. Times, Sept. 13, 1984, at 15, col. 4. Missiles apparently fired by Iranian
aircraft struck a Greek-owned tanker and a South Korean-owned tanker on September
16. Both vessels were well outside the war zone. L.A. Times, Sept. 17, 1984, at 114, col.
1-2. See also supra note 52. A three-week lull in air assaults on commercial shipping
ended October 8, 1984, when Iraqi warplanes attacked a Greek-owned supertanker
southwest of Kharg Island. Six men were killed in the incident. L.A. Times, Oct. 9,
1984, at 17, col. 1-3. On October 12, 1984, unidentified warplanes, but presumably Iranian aircraft, attacked a Greek-owned tanker, inflicting heavy damage. The incident occurred near the Saudi Arabian port of Ras Tanura. N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1984, at A3,
col. 1.See also supra notes 53 and 55.
153. See 1982 Convention, supra note 4, preamble and art. 301; see also supra
notes 1-6 and accompanying text and notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
154. A Soviet ship was damaged by an explosion in the Red Sea on July 9, 1984.
N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1984, at A6, col. 6.
155. L.A. Times, Sept. 20, 1984, at 15, col. 1. Some accounts place the number of
ships struck by explosives at nineteen. L.A. Times, Sept. 22, 1984, at 125, Col. 6. Ships
from diverse countries were hit, including Soviet, Chinese, Greek, Turkish, Liberian, and
East German vessels. L.A. Times, Aug. 12, 1984, at I1,col. 2.
156. L.A. Times, Aug. 12, 1984, at I1,col. 2.
157. Id.
158. Wall St. J., Aug. 6, 1984, at 21, col. 3. Because the explosions occurred in
these two locations, United States analysts believed from early August 1984 that they
involved purposeful acts of sabotage. Id.
159. Id.
160. L.A. Times, Aug. 27, 1984, at 127, col. 2.
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As in the Persian Gulf,'16 the rights of free navigation by neutral,
nonbelligerent vessels were impaired and threatened by acts of militaristic violence.1 62 Once again, international law governing the free
and peaceful use of world seas1 and
the recently drafted Convention
63
treaty were flagrantly violated.
What makes the Red Sea mining so crucially significant to the
entire world is the disruptive threat it poses to the free passage of
vessels through the Suez Canal, one of the world's most important
international waterways.16 4 One thousand seven hundred vessels a
month transit this canal that connects Europe to South and East
Asia. 65 The Suez Canal, linking the Mediterranean Sea and the
Gulf of Suez, is essential to commercial shipping. Additionally, it
earns Egypt about one billion dollars a year in tolls.' 66 There have
been no explosions in the Canal itself, the closest explosion occurring
twelve miles south in the Gulf of Suez.' 67
First indications pointed to either Libya or Iran as the source of
the Red Sea and Gulf of Suez explosives. 6 8 Egyptian Defense Minister Abdel-Halim abu Ghazala spoke on August 10, 1984, of being
"seventy percent sure" that Libya and Iran planted the mines.6 9 On
August 1, 1984, the Islamic Jihand, a pro-Iranian terrorist organization, 70 claimed responsibility for planting 190 mines throughout the
Red Sea.' 7 ' Iran's official (state-controlled) Teheran radio reported
on August 7, 1984, that this extremist group was responsible for the
mining, and during the same broadcast praised the group., 2 Nonetheless, the following day, the Iranian Foreign Ministry condemned
the mining and blamed the United States. 7 3 Later, the Ayatolla
Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran's supreme leader, also criticized the bomb-

161. See supra notes 50-153 and accompanying text.
162. L.A. Times, Aug. 19, 1984, at 127, col. 1.
163. See 1982 Convention, supra note 4, preamble and art. 300-01.
164. L.A. Times, Aug. 19, 1984, at 127, col. 1.
165. L.A. Times, Aug. 12, 1984, at I1, col. 2.
166. L.A. Times, Aug. 19, 1984, at 127, col. 1.
167. L.A. Times, Aug. 11, 1984, at 16, col. 2.
168. Id. at col. 1.
169. Id.
170. L.A. Times, Aug. 14, 1984, at 14, col. 5.
171. L.A. Times, Aug. 12, 1984, at IVI, col. 4.
172. N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1984, at A8, col. 1-2. "All the arrogant powers are helpless, unable to save the dozens of ships facing destruction in the Gulf of Suez and the
Red Sea every day," said the Teheran broadcast. Id.
173. L.A. Times, Aug. 12, 1984, at 135, col. 3; see also N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1984,
at As, col. 3.

ing and said it was "against world feeling and Islam."1 "4
By August 13, 1984, Egypt, at least, declined to blame Iran for
the Red Sea attacks.17 5 Egyptian President Mubarak expressed suspicion that Libya was involved in the explosions in the Red Sea."'
Military experts believe the mining of the Gulf of Suez and Red Sea
must have been the work of sophisticated international terrorists supported by a national government.17 7 Egypt continued in late September to 8suspect Libya as being ultimately guilty of placing the
17
mines.
The cynosure of Egyptian suspicion is the Libyan ship Ghat (originally reported by Egypt to be the Ghada).17 1 The Ghat made a mysterious, meandering journey in July through the Gulf of Suez and
the Red Sea.18 0 The Libyan vessel arrived unannounced at the Suez
Canal on July 6, 1984, having failed to give the forty-eight-hour advance notice the Suez Canal Authority customarily requires of all
ships wanting to transit the Canal.1 8 The ship was either not
searched or only given a cursory inspection. It then travelled down
the Gulf of Suez and the Red Sea to Assab, an Ethiopian port,
where it unloaded its cargo. 8 2 The Ghat then returned to the Canal,
but its entire round trip took fifteen days instead of the normal
four.18 3 All the explosions occurred after the Ghat's voyage.18 4 When
the ship first entered the Canal, it had a crew of twenty-eight; when
it returned fifteen days later, the vessel had a crew of only twentysix.1 85 Intelligence experts hypothesized that the extra time the Ghat
took to make the journey was spent weaving a convoluted course
through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Suez, as it planted explosive

174. L.A. Times, supra note 173.
175. L.A. Times, Aug. 14, 1984, at 14, col. 6.
176. Id. In an interview published October 18, 1984, President Mubarak unequivocally declared that Iran was not involved in the Red Sea mining. He reiterated his charge
that Libya was responsible for the mining. N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1984, at 6, col. 6.
177. L.A. Times, Aug. 14, 1984, at 14, col. 4. Colonel Jonathan Alford, deputy
director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (based in London) said, "I
think, in the absence of other information, we have to assume this is a relatively sophisticated group of terrorists with relatively sophisticated mines . . . . It is hard to see how
any group could do this without the support of some nation." Id. at col. 4-5.
178. L.A. Times, Sept. 20, 1984, at I5, col. 1. The Egyptian defense minister admitted that there still was no proof. Id. But see infra notes 201-05 and accompanying
text.
179. N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1984, at A3, col. 1.
180. N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1984, at A8, col. 1-3.
181. Id. at col. 2.
182. Id. at col. 1.
183. N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1984, at A8, col. 2. Other canal sources say that the
journey could normally have taken as long as eight days. L.A. Times, Aug. 16, 1984, at
128, col. 2.
184. N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1984, at A8, col. 2.
185. L.A. Times, Aug. 16, 1984, at 128, col. 2-3.
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devices. 86
On August 6, 1984, Egypt requested the assistance of the United
States in clearing the Red Sea shipping lanes of mines.187 The
United States used minesweeping helicopters, 18 8 as well as United
States troops and a sonar-equipped U.S. Navy ship, in an attempt to
locate the mines."89 These efforts failed to discover any mines in the
Gulf of Suez or in the Red Sea.1 90
American minesweeping efforts were also brought to bear in Saudi
Arabian territorial waters, sea routes and approaches to Saudi Red
Sea ports.19 ' Here, also, American helicopters and French minesweepers9 2 were unable to find any explosive devices in the Saudi
waters.
The search for mines in the Gulf of Suez and the Red Sea, which
began in mid-August, was a multinational effort. British and French
minesweepers and support vessels immediately joined the Americans
in looking for the mines.' 9 3 Also, several Soviet minesweepers, conducting operations independent of the Western nations, scoured the
southern portion of the Red Sea near South Yemen.9 Additionally,
four Italian minesweepers began searching for mines in the Gulf of
Suez in late August or early September. 9 5
On August 26, 1984, the commander of the British minesweeping
forces declared that the minesweeping project might last as long as
three months. 9 " Though the Americans discontinued their search in
mid-September,' 197 the British, French and Italian forces continued
to search for mines.'98 Early in September, the French found two
Soviet-made mines that dated back to the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. 99
186. Id.
187. L.A. Times, Aug. 7, 1984, at I1, col. 6.
188. Id.
189. L.A. Times, Aug. 15, 1984, at II, col. 5.
190. L.A. Times, Sept. 22, 1984, at 125, col. 6. These efforts continued for a
month, beginning August 17, 1984. Id.
191. L.A. Times, Aug. 26, 1984, at 14, col. 4.
192. Id.
193. L.A. Times, Aug. 15, 1984, at I1, col. 5.
194. L.A. Times, Aug. 27, 1984, at 17, col. 2.
195. Id. In late August, Egypt also began requesting ships using the Suez Canal to
declare any dangerous cargo they were carrying. Any ship failing to declare the cargo
was to be fined, while a ship failing to make any declaration at all was to be barred from
the canal for two years. Id. at col. 3.
196. Id. at col. 1.
197. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
198. L.A. Times, Sept. 22, 1984, at 125, col. 1-6; see also L.A. Times, Sept. 20,
1984, at 15, col. 1-3.
199. L.A. Times, Sept. 22, 1984, at 125, col. 2-3. On Sept. 20, 1984, the French

After a mysterious explosion damaged a Saudi Arabian passenger
ship on September 20, 1984, the French and Italian minesweeping
forces extended their Gulf of Suez exploration. 0 0
The first breakthrough in this multinational minesweeping effort
came on September 19, 1984, when the defense minister of Egypt
announced that the British Navy had found a mine that was "almost
brand new." 201 A few days later, Egyptian military sources and
others close to the investigation of this cylindrical "mine-like object"
intimated that it was a tube-launched mine manufactured by the Soviet Union. 2 British and Egyptian mine experts were "ninety percent sure" the device was a mine made by the Soviet Union for export.20 3 This conclusion solidified previous Egyptian and Western
conjecture that Libya was probably responsible for planting the
mines in the Red Sea and Gulf of Suez,20 4 because the Soviet Union
has been a major supplier of military armaments to Libya since
Colonel Qaddafi became ruler of Libya fifteen years ago. 5
In an August 21, 1984, editorial, The New York Times noted that
the effect of having a multinational minesweeping force which included the Soviet Union, albeit operating independently, should be
perceived as a "two-sided endorsement of free navigation. ' 206 The
newspaper opined that the mining seemed to be designed to "humiliate a vulnerable Egypt. '207 The editorial urged Egypt, if it was established that Libya was responsible for the mining, to take its case
against Libya before the "underused" International Court of Justice. 208 The editorial further recognized that a World Court decision
could never restrain a "rogue" nation such as Libya from perpetratfound "a few mine-like objects which appear to be a part of an old mine field," according
to a French Embassy source in Cairo. Id. at col. 1-2.
200. Id. at col. 1-5.
201. L.A. Times, Sept. 25, 1984, at I5, col. 2.
202. N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1984, at A13, col. 1-6.
203. Id. One Egyptian source, who was closely involved in the mining investigation, stated that the detonator and instrumentation of the mine appeared to be of Soviet
origin. The tubular nature of the mine indicated that it would normally be launched by a
submarine. Egyptian and Western sources stated that an ordinary ship could be modified
to launch such a device. Id. at col. 2-6.
204. N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1984, at A13, col. 5. On October 3, 1984, a United
States State Department official stated that "there is persuasive circumstantial evidence
indicating that Libya was involved in mining the entrance to the Red Sea." N.Y. Times,
Oct. 4, 1984, at A10, col. 6.
205. N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1984, at A13, col. 3.
206. N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1984, at A28, col. 1-2.
207. Id.
208. Id. The editorial analogized the situation to Nicaragua's taking its case involving mining against the United States to the International Court of Justice. On October 22, 1984, the Foreign Minister of Italy complained that member countries of the
United Nations should make more use of the World Court. "The question of the mines
recklessly scattered in the Red Sea last summer" presented the appropriate problem
which the United Nations "as a whole should have and could have tackled," according to
the minister. N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1984, at 4, col. 3.
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ing similar terrorist activities. A court opinion could, however, shame
the criminal and help build an international movement for punitive
measures.2 9 The editorial concluded by stating: "Asserting the freedom of navigation by international flotilla is the essential immediate
remedy. Reasserting that freedom in court would affirm a principle
that all civilized nations recognize as a basic international law. 21 0
Conclusion
Freedom of navigation lies at the heart of the law of the sea. This
fundamental international right was repeatedly violated in 1984.
This fact should serve to educate us that public international law 211
is of meager consequence when it is flouted by violent terrorist and
military uses of the world's oceans and seas. 212 Perhaps this depressing reality is the actual reason the
Convention failed to address the
213
issue of military uses of the sea.
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA:

DEVELOPMENTS AND RELATED ISSUES

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Convention) concluded at Montego Bay on December 10, 1982. On this
date the Convention was opened for signature. 14 It remained open
until December 9, 1984, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Jamaica, and also from July 1, 1983, until December 9, 1984, at the
United Nations headquarters in New York.21 5 One year after sixty
States ratify or accede to it, the Convention will become effective.2 16
The final date for ratification was December 9, 1984.211 The Convention, however, will remain open indefinitely for any nation wishing to
209. N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1984, at A24, col. 2.
210. Id.
211. 1982 Convention, supra note 4.
212. See supra notes 207-10 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text. See also note 153 and accompanying text.
214. 1982 Convention, supra note 4, art. 305 defines "signature" as it is used in
the Convention. Id. at art. 305.
215. Id. at art. 305(2). For a capsule history of the Convention, see Synopsis: Recent Developments in the Law of the Sea 1982-83, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 769, 770-72
(1984).
216. 1982 Convention, supra note 4, art. 308(1). Art. 305-06 define ratification
and accession as they are used in the Convention. 1982 Convention, supra note 4, art.
305-06.
217. U.N. Dep't of Pub. Information, Press Release SEA/561, at 2 [hereinafter
cited as Press Release SEA/561].

accede to it.218
With ratification by the Ivory Coast on March 26, 1984,219 and
the Philippines on May 8, 1984,220 eleven states have ratified the
Convention. 221 As of January 30, 1984, 134 States signed the Convention. 222 Earlier in 1984, there were indications that Belgium,
West Germany (Federal Republic of Germany), Italy, and the
United Kingdom would sign the Convention by the December 9,
1984, deadline. 223 But by late November it became apparent that
none of these European countries would sign the treaty. 224
On December 14, 1983, the United Nations General Assembly
adopted a resolution urging all states to consider signing and ratifying the Convention; it entreated all nations "to refrain from taking
any action directed at undermining the Convention or defeating its
purpose. '225 The recorded vote was 136 in favor and two against
(Turkey, United States), with six abstentions (Belgium, Bolivia,6
Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, United Kingdom). 22
The resolution also included approval of recommendations contained
in the Secretary-General's report on the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (Conference).227
One recommendation contained in the Secretary-General's report
urged that the Office of Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral for the Law of the Sea be continued as the core office of the
United Nations for law of the sea matters.228 Bernardo Zuleto, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Law of the Sea
Conference since November 1974, died on December 1, 1983.229 He
was replaced by Satya Nandan, a national of Fiji, on January 16,
1984.230
During the debate on the resolution, the financing of the Prepara218. Id.
219. Citizens for Ocean Law, Update, May 1984, at 1 [hereinafter cited as
Update].
220. Citizens for Ocean Law, Update, June 1984, at 1.
221. Recent Actions Regarding to Which the United States Is Not a Party, 23
IL.M. 235 (Jan. 1984). The additional ratifying States are Bahamas, Belize, Egypt, Fiji,
Ghana, Jamaica, Mexico, Nambia, and Zambia.
222. Id.
223. Citizens for Ocean Law, Update, July 1984, at 1.
224. N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1984, at 3, col. 4-6.
225. Law of the Sea: Refrainfrom Underminingthe Convention, UN CHRON. Feb.
1984, at 95.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. The Secretary General's report said that the Office "possessed the necessary background knowledge and experience of the work of the Conference, the political
and economic objectives of States, the intricacies of the formal and informal documentation of the Conference and the detailed features of the different parts of the Convention."

Id.
229. Id. at 96. Mr. Zuleta was a national of Columbia.
230. Id.
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tory Commission (Commission) established by the Conference
chiefly to draft rules and regulations governing deep seabed mining,
became the subject of objections, particularly from Turkey and the
United States. 231 Turkey clearly reserved its right not to contribute
funds spent on implementing the Convention. The United States argued that the nation parties to the Convention should help bear the
costs of the Commission. 23 2 The United States has indicated that it
will continue to withhold its portion of the regular United Nations
budget allocated for support of Part XI of the Convention, a section
the United States adamantly
opposes because of its treatment of
233
deep seabed development.

In May 1984 President Reagan reiterated these objections to the

Convention. 234 According to the President, the deep seabed mining

provisions conflict with United States objectives.2 35 The President
stated that deep seabed mining regime problems include:
- provisions that would actually deter future development of deep seabed
resources, when such development should serve the interest of all countries;
- a decisionmaking process that would not give the United States or others
a role that fairly reflects and protects their interests;
- provisions that would allow amendments without United States approval.
This is incompatible with our approach to treaties;
- stipulations relating to mandatory transfer of private technology and the
possibility of national liberation movements sharing in benefits; and
- the absence of assured access for future qualified
deep seabed miners to
promote the development of these resources.23 "

The President noted many positive achievements of the Conven-

tion and affirmed that the United States would obey the international law embodied in the Convention that pertains "to traditional

uses of the ocean.

237

On the other hand, the President did not fore-

see any forthcoming Convention amendments that would permit the

United States to sign the treaty.238
The Commission for the International SeaBed Authority (Author-

231. Id. at 95. Resolution I of the Conference established the Preparatory Commission and defined its responsibilities. Final Act of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1/L.30, Annex I, res. I (1982).
See infra notes 239-68 and accompanying text (discussing the 1984 work of the Preparatory Commission).
232. See supra note 223.

233. Id.
234. U.S. Policy in the Pacific Island Region, 20
50 (May 4, 1984).
235. Id. at 650.
236. Id.

237. Id.
238. Id.

WEEKLY COMP. PRES.

Doc. 649-

ity) and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea held its
second formal meeting in Kingston, Jamaica from March 19 to April
13, 1984.239 The Commission decided at its first session in 1984 to
hold a second informal gathering from August 13 to September 5,
1984, in Geneva, Switzerland. 240 The following regular meeting was
held in Kingston from March 11 to April 5, 1985.241
To meet the needs of several Western industrialized countries
whose companies or consortia had engaged in exploration, research,
and development pertaining to polymetallic nodules, Conference
Resolution 11242 established a regime to accomodate such preparatory investment in deep seabed mining activities.2 43 Certain national
governmental or private enterprises, designated as "pioneer investors," are virtually guaranteed to receive seabed mining contracts
from the Authority. 24 4 Resolution II named eight pioneers that will
receive these rights: France, India, the Soviet Union, and Japan (all
of which are Convention signatories); and four multinational consortia composed of member companies from Canada, Japan, and the
Netherlands, which have signed the Convention, and from Belgium,
West Germany, Italy, the United 245
Kingdom, and the United States,
which have not signed the treaty.
During its first 1984 session the Commission provisionally adopted
twenty rules for registering the applications of pioneer investors for
deep seabed mining contracts. 246 These draft rules resulted from the
high priority assigned at the 1983 meeting to the completion of rules
to implement Resolution 11.247 This resolution protects pioneer investors in deep seabed mining so registration can begin. 48 The Coi239. Press Release SEA/561, supra note 217, at 1. The Commission held its first
meeting in two sessions last year: from March 15 to April 18, 1983, and from August 15

to September 19, 1983. Id.
240. Id.

241. Id.
242. Final act of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/121, Annex I, res. 11 (1982). Resolution II of the Final Act is
entitled "Governing Preparatory Investment in Pioneer Activities Relating to Polymetallic Nodules."
243. Press Release SEA/561, supra note 217, at 3. For an excellent discussion of
polymetallic nodules and the deep seabed, see Halback, Deep-Sea Metallic Deposits, 9
OCEAN MANAGEMENT 35-60 (1984). The author concludes that deep-sea polymetallic
nodules might be feasibly mined sometime in the 1990's, "when various economic and
technical factors become more favorable." Polymetallic nodules are rounded, irregularly
shaped mineral masses that lie at or near the surface of deep ocean beds. The nodules
contain nickel, manganese, cobalt, copper, and traces of other metals.
244. Press Release SEA/ 561, supra note 217, at 3. For an overview of the issue of
"pioneer investors" see Synopsis: Recent Developments in the Law of the Sea 1981-1982
20 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 679, 696-98 (1983).
245. Id. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
246. Press Release SEA/561, supra note 217, at 4.
247. Update, supra note 219, at 1-2.
248. Id.
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mission also began considering the crucial issues of the composition
and functions of the group of experts who will review pioneer investor applications, the confidentiality of data provided by pioneer investors, and the overlapping claims for tracts of the ocean floor by
pioneer investors.2 49 The session members agreed that Resolution II
will not allow the Commission to solve the overlapping claims issue,
which involves a timetable to extinguish these claims.250
With respect to the divisive issue of overlapping claims, two related problems have emerged. First, to obtain pioneer rights a consortium must have a sponsoring country ("certifying State") that
has signed the Convention.2 51 Five of the eight states constituting the
consortia have not signed the Convention. 252 The second problem,
which emanates from the first, is that Resolution II requires that the
sponsor guarantee that no overlapping claims exist with those of
other potential sponsors.2 53 The crux of this difficulty is that Resolution II does not specify a "deadline after which pending applications
may be processed, regardless of whether or not all eight pioneers
named have
found a sponsor that qualifies by having signed the 1982
'254
treaty.
The Chairman of the Commission, Joseph S. Warioba of the
United Republic of Tanzania, decided that the rules to implement
Resolution II cannot be finalized until the above quandary is clarified and resolved. 255 Nonetheless, the Soviet Union and India submitted letters of application to register as pioneer investors on July
21, 1983, and January 10, 1984, respectively. 25 They determined
between themselves that the areas of the ocean floor designated in
their applications do not overlap.257 However, these pending applications cannot be processed until the relevant rules and procedures are
enacted by the Commission.2 58 Thus, the Soviet Union has pressed
the Commission to act quickly in adopting the requisite rules so that
the pending applications can be registered.25 9 On the other hand, the
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Press Release SEA/561, supra note 217, at 1-2.
Update, supra note 219, at 1-2.
Press Release SEA/561, supra note 217, at 3.

256.

Press Release SEA/561, supra note 217, at 3.

Id.
Update, supra note 219, at 2.
Id.
Id.

257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Update, supra note 219, at 2. The Soviet Union and India agree that they
must consult with France and Japan concerning possible overlaps because all four states

Europeans and Japanese contend that no application may be
processed until overlapping ocean floor claims are resolved among all
the pioneers named in Resolution II, even though some potential
sponsoring countries have yet to sign the Convention.260
Between the Spring Commission session and the session scheduled
August 13 to September 5, 1984, efforts continued in attempt to
reach an accord on a procedure for determining the absence of overlapping claims among the potential pioneer investors named in Resolution II and to proceed to register pioneers.261 If such an agreement
can be achieved and the rules completed to implement Resolution II,
then the 1985 session of Commission in Kingston should be able to
process pioneer applications and register those that conform with
262
Resolution II and are not subject to disputed overlapping claims.
Significantly, on August 3, 1984, a "Provisional Understanding
Regarding Deep Seabed Matters" was signed by the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Italy, West Germany, Japan, and the United States.263 These eight industrialized nations
agreed on procedures to avoid conflicts over ocean floor mining
sites. 64 Each country will not infringe on the area of the claim of
another nation, where an application for a license or registration has
been filed either with the Commission or an individual country.265 At
the August meeting of the Commission in Geneva, the Soviet Union
threatened to introduce a resolution labelling the agreement among
the eight nations "illegal. 268
The first 1984 meeting of the Commission in Kingston also included a rule by rule consideration of the draft rules for administering the Authority. 2 7 At the second session the Commission planned
to continue its reading of the draft rules, and the U.N. Secretariat
was to have prepared several additional papers for the Preparatory
Commission's four Special Commissions. 268
have signed the Convention. Id.
260. Id. At the time of the Spring Convention meeting, no qualified sponsors had
stepped forward for the four multinational consortia. Id.
261. Citizens for Ocean Law, Update, July 1984, at I.
262. Id.
263. Nautilus, Ocean Sci. News, Aug. 21, 1984, at 6.
264. Id.
265. Id. The agreement also calls for a moratorium on mining before 1988. On
April 23, 1984, the United States, under Public Law 96-283, certified five applications to
conduct seabed mining exploration. Five licenses are expected to be issued in the ClarionClipperton zone of the northeast equatorial Pacific. The four United States consortia
involved in the seabed mining exploration resolved any mine site overlaps last December
1983. Citizens for Ocean Law, Update, July 1984, at 1-2.
266. Nautilus, Ocean Sci. News, Sept. 11, 1984, at 5.
267. Press Release SEA/561, supra note 217, at 2.
268. Update, supra note 219, at 3. The four Special Commissions established at
the first session in 1983, deal respectively with: 1) Problems of land-based producers; 2)
The Enterprise; 3) The seabed mining code; and 4) The International Tribunal on the
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In late February 1984 the Soviet Union's Presidium issued a decree establishing a 200 mile exclusive economic zone that incorporates "the corresponding provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. ' 269 The Soviet exclusive economic zone
became effective March 1, 1984; it will be measured from "the same
basic lines" that determine Soviet territorial waters. 27 0 The Soviet
decree is extremely detailed, including provisions on freedom of navigation, fishing, scientific research, and pollution.27 1 It also allows for
overflight, the laying of underwater cables, pipelines, and other activities "permitted by international law. 272
MARINE ENVIRONMENT POLLUTION

East African Marine Pollution Treaty
In December 1983 eight East African countries with coasts on the
Indian Ocean sent legal representatives to a marine environment
meeting in Nairobi. 273 The purpose of this United Nations sponsored
meeting was to construct a draft treaty to protect the East African
coastal regions from marine pollution.274 The countries represented
ranged from Somalia in the north to Mozambique and Madagascar
in the south.275 The legal experts focused on measures to combat
pollution from land-based sources, as well as on ways to control oil
spills from tankers travelling along the East African coast.27 6
Caribbean Marine Environment Protection Convention
In January 1984 President Reagan submitted for Senate ratification the Convention for the Protection and Development of the
Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean region (also known as
the Cartagena Convention).27 The Cartagena Convention creates
Law of the Sea. Press Release SEA/561, supra note 217 at 2.
269. Nautilus, Ocean Sei. News, Mar. 26, 1984, at 1. See 1982 Convention, supra
note 4, art. 4, art. 55-75 (setting forth the exclusive economic zone provisions of the
Convention).
270. Nautilus, Ocean Sci. News, Mar. 26, 1984, at 1.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 2. For details of the Soviet exclusive economic zone, see generally id. at
1-4.
273. The Times (London), Dec. 7, 1983, at 10, col. 7.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Message to the Senate Transmitting the Convention and Related Documents,
20 WEEKLY Comp. Ppas. Doc. 106-07 (Jan. 27, 1984). The President also sent to the
Senate a Protocol to the Convention concerned with oil spills and the Final Act of the

.827

general legal obligations for its contracting parties to preserve the
marine environment of the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and
immediately proximate areas of the Atlantic Ocean. 8 It covers multifarious forms of marine pollution: from ships, from seabed activities, and from the air. 27 9 The Cartagena Convention also provides for
specifically protected areas, for cooperation in emergency circumstances, and for environmental impact assessments. 28 0 The first meeting of the contracting parties will occur no later than two years after
the Cartagena Convention takes effect,
which will happen when the
281
ninth nation ratifies this convention.
Incinerationof Hazardous Wastes at Sea
The at-sea incineration of hazardous wastes continues to stir controversy. Presently, the only incineration site is one in the Gulf of
Mexico 8 2 In November 1983 thousands of Texans protested the decision of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to tentatively
permit the incinerator ships Vulcanus I and Vulcanus II to burn
hazardous wastes 150 miles offshore in the Gulf of Mexico.283
The Vulcanus I has been allowed to make thirteen tests in United
States waters since 1974. 2 An official of Chemical Waste Management, which owns the incinerator ships, contended in April 1984 that
enough information had been gathered from these tests to approve
permanent at-sea burning.285 On April 23, 1984, Steven Schatzow,
an EPA official, recommended that the commercial incineration of
toxic wastes be impermissible until 1985.26 He proposed more tests
that would mean burning 3.3 million gallons of waste in the Gulf to
study how completely chemicals are destroyed by incinerator ships
and to further examine the impact of the burning on the sea and
air. 2817 Schatzow confirmed that EPA scientists continue to believe
Cartagena Conference that adopted the Convention and Protocol. Sixteen nations drafted
and signed the Cartagena Convention at a conference in Cartagena de Indias, Colombia
on March 24, 1983. Frazer and Petersen, Protecting Caribbean Waters: The Cartagena
Convention, OCEANUS, Spring 1984, at 85, 86. The sixteen signatories are Colombia,
Costa Rica, Cuba, France, Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, the
Netherlands, Nicaragua, Panama, St. Lucia, the United Kingdom, the United States,
and Venezuela. Id.
278. Message to the Senate, 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 106 (Jan. 27, 1984).
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 107; see Frazer and Petersen, supra note 277, at 88.
282. Nautilus, Ocean Sci. News, Aug. 14, 1984, at 5.
283. N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 1983, at El0, col. 1. Earlier in 1983, the EPA reported
that 150 million metric tons of toxic wastes are generated each year. Many widely used
methods of disposing the wastes, including landfills, have been found unsatisfactory. Id.
284. N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1984, at A16, col. 6.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. See Bond, At-Sea Incinerationof Hazardous Wastes, ENVTL. Sci. TECH.,
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that at-sea incineration offers a feasible way to dispose of hazardous
wastes.2 88 Nonetheless, other groups disagree. For instance, a Greenpeace U.S.A. director stated that more "test burning289will not resolve
the gravest environmental fear, the risk of a spill.
In August the House of Representatives Committee on Govern-

ment Operations began to investigate the EPA regulatory program
for at-sea incineration of hazardous waste. 90 A hearing was held in
July 1984 in San Rafael, California, by the committee's environmental subcommittee. 2 91 The chairman of the subcommittee, Represen-

tative Mike Synar, observed that plans were being made by the EPA
to name incineration sites in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. 292 Although the EPA intended to issue final regulations governing the atsea incineration of hazardous wastes by December 1984,293 the

agency still had not enacted the pertinent regulations by the end of
1984.94

Disposal of Radioactive Wastes at Sea

The disposal of both high and low-level radioactive wastes occupied most of the agenda at the London Dumping Convention (LDC),
conducted in London from February 20-24, 1984.298 An attempt by

some nations to achieve an agreement banning the burying of highlevel radioactive waste beneath the seabed failed.2 9" They argued

that "subseabed emplacement" of high-level radioactive wastes is illegal under the terms of the LDC. 97 Nevertheless, this interpretation, advocated by the Scandanavian countries, was voted down. 2 8
An opposing view is that the "subseabed emplacement" of conMay 1984, 148-52. The author examines testing done by the Vulcanus I and other incinerator ships since 1972 and concludes that the "reputed success of ocean incineration of
hazardous waste rests on invalid measurements and assumptions." Id. at 148.
288. N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1984, at A16, col. 6.
289. Id.
290. Nautilus, Ocean Sci. News, Aug. 14, 1984, at 5.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 5-6.
294. Nautilus, Ocean Sci. News, Jan. 14, 1985, at 5.
295. Nautilus, Ocean Sci. News, Mar. 19, 1984, at 1. In attendance were representatives of forty-four nations. Id. The LDC is the major international agreement governing the dumping of wastes into the oceans. See Comment, Extension of Ocean Dumping Legislation Under the Marine Protection,Research, and SanctuariesAct to a United
States Exclusive Economic Zone, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REv., 733, 738-40 (1984).
296. Nautilus, supra note 295, at 1.
297. Id.
298. Id.

tainers of highly radioactive waste is not within the scope of the
LDC.299 Nine nations, including the United States and Great Britain, are conducting research into the feasibility of embedding "torpedo-cannisters" of high-level waste in deep pockets of seabed soil.300
With the support of the United States, an agreement was reached
whereby research would continue on this subject, while no emplacement would be undertaken until regulations had been approved by
the LDC.301
The LDC ban on the disposal of low-level radioactive wastes was
extended until September 1985.302 This extension will permit scientists to complete a study on the environmental effects of dumping
low-level radioactive wastes into the sea. 03 With no firm decision
forthcoming on either the issue of high-level or low-level radioactive
waste, the meeting of the LDC
was described by one observer as
'30 4
disarray.
in
"ended
having
The National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere
(NACOA), a presidential advisory body, recommended in July 1984
that the United States consider revising its policy of not allowing
ocean dumping of low-level radioactive waste. 30 5 The group did not
unequivocally endorse the ocean as a site for waste disposal, but it
did suggest that a failure to contemplate the ocean as a possible
dumping location could have the effect of drying up government
funds needed for research into the impact of disposal at sea.306 "If
there are reasons why the ocean is unacceptable, we need to know
them" said the committee.30 7 NACOA did not urge a major shift
from "land-oriented" policy at the present time.30 8 It did call, however, for sufficient funding and adequate monitoring and research efforts to accurately assess the effects of ocean disposal of low-level
radioactive wastes. 309
299. The Times (London), Feb. 25, 1984, at 2, col. 3.
300. N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1984, at A18, col. 4. See generally Sopher and Penrose,
Burying Radioactive Waste in the Deep-Sea Floor, 29 SEA FRONTIERS 210 (July-Aug.
1983). The authors' research seems to predict favorable results for deep seabed burying
of radioactive waste.
301. Nautilus, supra note 295, at 1.
302. N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1984, at A18, col. 3.
303. Id.
304. The Times (London), Feb. 25, 1984, at 2, col. 2-3.
305. Nautilus, Ocean Sci. News, July 17, 1984, at 5-6. The group published a 213page report, "Nuclear Waste Management & the Use of the Sea." Id. at 5.
306. Id.

307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. The argument for the use of the oceans is summarized by NACOA as:
The ocean already contains a large amount of natural radioactivity, either longlived radionuclides and their daughter products that have been on earth from
the beginning or relatively short-lived radionuclides formed by the interaction of
cosmic radiation with the atmosphere .... Our knowledge of ocean processes
is good enough to make adequate estimates of the fate of any anthropogenic

[VOL 22: 801, 1985]

Recent Developments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

On June 4, 1984, the United States Navy released a report announcing that it was abandoning plans to dispose of aging nuclear
submarines at sea.310 An original Navy plan, four years old in 1984,
called for disposal of entire submarines, including their nuclear compartments, two and a half miles deep in the ocean, far from the
shores of the United States. 11 As an alternative, earlier in 1984, the
Navy considered burying some of its 100 aging nuclear-powered submarines3 12 in the ocean with the nuclear core of the engines removed.313 Environmental groups opposed all Navy plans for disposal
of the nuclear-powered submarines. 4 The Navy has now chosen to
bury nine decommissioned
submarines on government land rather
31 5
than in the ocean.

Transportationof Nuclear Materials by Sea
A collision on August 25, 1984, between a French freighter and a
West German passenger ferry that resulted in the sinking of the
freighter with a 360-ton cargo of uranium hexafluoride, created
fresh controversy and fears over the use of the sea to transport nuclear materials.3 16 The uranium hexafluoride, a raw material from
which nuclear fuel is made, never posed a severe radiation danger.
On board the freighter, however, were three barrels of partially
processed uranium, which is more hazardous.311 Following the sinking, daily water readings detected no signs of leaking radioactivity. 18
Fear was initially spread because the French shipowner was not
prompt in revealing the true nature of the cargo.3 19 Only after presradioactivity placed in the ocean . . . [and] the potential danger to humans is
much less if radioactivity is placed in the ocean than in the various land-based
alternatives.

Id. at 6.
310. N.Y. Times, June 5, 1984, at A7, col. 1-6.
311. Id. at col. 2.
312. N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1984, at A13, col. 1.
313. Id. at col. 2.
314. Id. at col. 2-3.
315. N.Y. Times, June 5, 1984, at A7, col. 3. The Navy report stated: "Based on a
consideration of all current factors bearing on a disposal action of the kind contemplated,
the Navy's preferred alternative at this time is to dispose of the reactor compartments by
land burial. This is the method currently used in the United States for disposal of low-

level radioactive waste." Id. at col. 5-6.
316.
317.
318.
319.

Angier, A Shipwreck Sends a Warning, TIME, Sept. 10, 1984, at 33.
Id.
Id.
Id.

sure was exerted by Greenpeace, the international environmental organization, did the true details emerge about the potentially dangerous cargo. 320 The uranium was being shipped to the Soviet Union to
be processed into nuclear fuel; after processing, it was to be returned
to France for use in nuclear power plants. 32 1 Criticism arose from
Europeans and environmental groups that inadequate safety mea3 22
sures are taken on ships that increasingly transport nuclear cargo.
The International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code governs the
transport of radioactive materials over Western European waters.'
The regulations included in this code, however, are antiquated, and
are currently being
rewritten by the International Maritime Organi323
zation (IMO).
Oil Pollution
On April 19, 1984, a federal district court in Chicago held that
Standard Oil of Indiana was liable3 24 for up to 700 million dollars in
damages resulting from a massive oil spill on the French coast,
caused by the 1978 wreck of an oil supertanker. 25 The suit involved
claims against the oil company by the French government, local
French towns, French fishing organizations, local hotel keepers, and
environmentalist groups.3 26 The court concluded that the owner of
the ship had failed to ensure the seaworthiness of the tanker and was
negligent in training its crew. 327 The decision was described as
landmark environmental law because it established for the first time
that responsibility for marine pollution rests with the ultimate owner
of a vessel. 28
The IMO sponsored a conference in London on liability and compensation for oil pollution from April 30 to May 25, 1984.329 The
320. Id.
321. Id. Belgium, Italy, and Switzerland have made similar arrangements with the
Soviet Union.
322. Id.
323. Id. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is a United Nations
agency, comprising about 120 countries; until 1982 the IMO was known as IMCO, the
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. R. CHURCHILL AND A. LOWE,
THE LAW OF THE SEA 18 (1983). IMO mainly concentrates on international shipping; it
has issued a number of significant regulations concerning navigation and pollution. It
also has drafted more than two dozen major documents (conventions), many of which
have been ratified by the IMO member states. Id.
324. In re Oil Spill by AMOCO Cadiz, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1984, at A2, col. 3-4
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 19, 1984); see 7 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 5, at 129-30 (May 9,
1984).
325. N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1984, at A2, col. 3-4.
326. Id. at col. 4.
327. 7 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 5, at 129-30.
328. N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1984, at A2., col. 3-4.
329. Citizens for Ocean Law, Update, June 1984, at 1; see also Citizens for Ocean
Law, Update, May 1984, at 4.

Recent Developments

[VOL. 22: 801, 1985]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

conference considered and adopted revised protocols to the 1969 International Convention in Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage
and the 1971 International Convention on the Establishment of an
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage. 330
The protocols will probably not become effective until 1990.331
The revised protocols increased possible liability for vessel owners
by eliminating a fourteen million dollar liability ceiling and erecting
a three million dollar floor with a ceiling of up to sixty million dollars.3 32 Among other changes, the pollution damage definition was
altered to incorporate costs for restoring the marine environment.333
The protocols also expanded their ambit beyond the territorial seas
to cover incidents occurring within the 200 mile Exclusive Zone of
nation parties.334 No agreement was reached, however, on how to
update the liability and compensation limits in a continuously timely
fashion.335
MARINE MAMMALS

At its annual meeting of 1984, held in Buenos Aires, the International Whaling Commission (IWC) sharply lowered the annual
whaling quotas from 9,390 permitted in 1984 to 6,623 for the 1985
season.33 6 The 1985 season will be the last one before the start of a
worldwide moratorium on all commercial whale hunting.337 The
moratorium was approved by the IWC in 1982, but three nations
(Japan, Norway, and the Soviet Union) still have continuing formal
objections.333 Under IWC rules, nations are not restricted by decisions to which they formally object.339 The world must wait to see if
the moratorium actually comes to fruition because the IWC lacks
actual enforcement powers.340
John Byrne, then chief of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
330. Citizens for Ocean Law, Update, June 1984, at 1; see 23 I.L.M. 151-213
(Jan. 1984) (reprinting a draft convention for the conference and the protocols).
331. Citizens for Ocean Law, Update, June 1984, at 1.
332. Id. at 1-2.
333. Id. at 2.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Nautilus, Marine Mammal News, May-June 1984, at 1. The IWC was established by the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62
Stat. 1716, T.I.A.S. No. 1849, 161 U.N.T.S. 72. See Synopsis, supra note 215, at 78789 & n.178.
337. Nautilus, supra note 336, at 1.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. L.A. Times, June 23, 1984, at 16, col. 3.

Administration, headed the United States delegation to the 1984
3 41
IWC meeting and served as the United States IWC commissioner.
Byrne left government in November 1984, but was asked to remain
as commissioner to the IWC because of the upcoming moratorium.3 42 He characterized the 1984 meeting as a success34 3 at which
"the United States has achieved its objective" of realizing lower quotas in 1985. 844
The most significant whaling cut involved the Southern Hemisphere minke whales, with the quota being slashed from 6,655 last
season to 4,244 in the coming season.3 45 Dr. Roger Payne, spokesman for the World Wildlife Fund-U.S., said, "We had a triumphant
vote on the South Atlantic Minkes. ' 346 Conservationists were generally pleased with the results of this year's IWC meeting.347
Japan, the Soviet Union, and Norway, the three major whaling
countries, objected vigorously to the IWC actions.34 8 Japan and the
Soviet Union absorbed all the lowered quotas for 1984, while Norway retained its old quotas. 349 All three nations have already indicated that they will not observe the moratorium which is to begin in
1986.350 If they fail to obey the moratorium or if they exceed their
1985 quotas, substantial fishing sanctions and restrictions on imports
to the United States may be imposed on the three countries by the

United States. 51
Eduardo Iglesias of Argentina was expected to depart as president
of the IWC in 1984, but due to the upcoming moratorium the present officers, including Iglesias, will remain in office for another

341. Nautilus, supra note 336, at 1.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 2.
344. L.A. Times, June 23, 1984, at I1,col. 2.
345. Nautilus, supra note 336, at I (which supplies an area by area count).
346. L.A. Times, June 23, 1984, at 16, col. 1.
347. Id. at II, col. 2.
348. Id.
349. Nautilus, supra note 336, at 1.
350. L.A. Times, June 23, 1984, at 16, col. 3.
351. Id. The United States Fisheries, Conservation and Management Act provides
that any nation that "diminishes the effectiveness" of an international whaling measure
will have its authorized catch from United States waters reduced by at least half. 16
U.S.C. § 1821 (e)(2)(1982).
On November 13, 1984, the United States Commerce Department announced that an
agreement had been reached between Japan and the United States that will permit Japan to continue whaling in United States waters until the end of 1987. N.Y. Times, Nov.
14, 1984, at Al2, col. 1.The agreement allowed Japanese whalers to take 400 sperm
whales in 1984 and will allow them to take 400 more in 1985. If Japan agrees to withdraw its objections to the IWC general ban on whaling, effective for Japan in 1988, by
April 1, 1985, Japan may take 200 sperm whales in 1986 and 1987. Id. at col. 1-2. On
November 9, 1984, conservationists filed suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia to compel the United States government to enforce sanctions
against Japan if it violates American law. Id. at 3; see 16 U.S.C. § 1821 (e)(2)(1982).
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year. 52 The 1985 IWC meeting will take place in England at a date
not yet arranged. 5 3
Sea otters in a crucial offshore California habitat may be endangered3 54 by a recent United States Supreme Court decision.3 55 In its
January 11, 1984, ruling, the Court rejected the argument of the
coastal states that the consistency clause of the Coastal Zone Management
Acts56 applied to leasing activities beyond the three mile
limit.35 7 By a five to four vote, the Supreme Court held that the sale
of outer continental shelf oil and gas leases is not an activity that
directly affects the coastal zone, and a consistency review is therefore not required.3 5 Oil spills from drilling activities could threaten
the southern sea otter, whose habitat lies within twelve miles of the
twenty-nine tracts that may be leased and ultimately drilled. 5 9
The United States and Japan concurred in a memorandum of understanding, dated June 5, 1984, that provides for Japanese cooperation with the United States in an effort to save the Dall porpoise. 60
The agreement will stay in effect until June 9, 1987, and for as long
as the Japanese are allowed to fish for gillnet salmon within the
United States fishery conservation zone.3 61
Japan promised that its fishermen will furnish accurate information concerning the condition of the Dall porpoise. 62 Additionally,
Japan will annually report the number of marine mammals, especially the Dall porpoise, that are captured during each fishing season. 63 Japanese and American scientists will cooperate in formulat352. Nautilus, supra note 336, at 1.
353. Id.
354. Nautilus, Marine Mammal News, Jan. 1984, at 3.
355. Secretary of Interior v. California, 104 S.Ct. 656 (1984).
356. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1982).
357. Secretary, 104 S. Ct. at 672.
358. Id. The consistency review clause of the Coastal Zone Management Act requires that "Each Federal agency conducting or supporting activities directly affecting
the coastal zone shall conduct or support those activities in a manner which is, to the
maximum extent practicable, consistent with approved state management programs." 16
U.S.C. § 1456 (c)(1)(1982).
359. Nautilus, supra note 354, at 3.
360. Nautilus, Marine Mammal News, May-June 1984, at 6.
361. Id. The United fishery conservation zone extends seaward two hundred miles
from the seaward boundary of each of the United States coastal states. 16 U.S.C. § 1811
(1982). The United States claims exclusive fishery management authority within its fishery conservation zone. 16 U.S.C. § 1812 (1982).
362. Nautilus, supra note 360, at 6.
363. Id. This computerized information will concentrate on those porpoises entangled in nets and the size of the mesh of the nets. Japan will also record the number of
porpoises that escape while they are being taken aboard. Id.

ing a three-year plan to calculate methods of decreasing or
eliminating the accidental take of Dall porpoises during Japanese
fishing of the gillnet salmon. 364 Furthermore, American scientific observers will be permitted on board Japanese fishing vessels within the
United States fishery conservation zone. 365 These observers will record data on the incidental capture of marine mammals, as well as
observe environmental conditions and evaluate gear characteristics of
the Japanese fishing operations.366
ANTARCTICA

The United Nations First Committee (political and security)
adopted a resolution November 30, 1983, requesting a United Nations study on the status of Antarctica that could threaten the
Antarctic Treaty. 36 7 The resolution asked the United Nations Secretary General "to prepare a comprehensive factual and objective
study of all aspects of the Antarctic Treaty and other relevant factors." 368 Led by Malayasia, the so-called "non-aligned countries" invoked a favorite United Nations theme, "the common heritage of
mankind," in voting for the resolution.3 69 The third world countries
would like to have Antarctica declared the "common heritage of
mankind," which would make its vast, largely unexploited resources
available to all countries. 37 0 The Secretary General was given a year
in which to prepare his report.371
The Antarctic Treaty was originally signed in 1959.72 It gives 3to
73
treaty signatories administrative responsibility for the continent.
The United Nations action jeopardizes this system of administration
and the parties' territorial claims in Antarctica.37 4 The United States
and the Soviet Union, in a rare cooperative effort, are expected to
oppose strongly any United Nations action that might undermine the
364. Id. Scientific information will be exchanged regularly, annual progress reports
issued, and reviews and recommendations for further action will be produced. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Nautilus, Ocean Sci. News, Jan. 2, 1984, at 1-2. See infra notes 372-75 and
accompanying text, which discuss the Antarctic Treaty.
368. Nautilus, supra note 367, at 1-2. One topic the study may address is the
applicability of Law of the Sea Convention provisions on oil and gas exploration to Antarctica's outer continental shelf.
369. Id. at 2. Malaysia would like to make the continent an international
trusteeship.
370. The Times (London), Dec. 17, 1983, at 6, col. 5.
371. Id.
372. Nautilus, supra note 367, at 2.
373. Id.
374. Id. Parties to the Antarctic Treaty include the United States, the Soviet
Union, Australia, Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, South Africa, West Germany, and India.

[VOL. 22: 801, 1985]

Recent Developments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

37 5

treaty.

CANADA-UNITED STATES GEORGES BANK DISPUTE

The International Court of Justice, in an October 12, 1984, ruling
delimited an ocean boundary in an area between New England and
Nova Scotia, awarding part of the resource rich Georges Bank to
Canada but giving the larger section to the United States. 37 6 A spe3 77
cial World Court panel voted four to one in favor of the ruling.
The Court gave approximately one-sixth of the bank to Canada,
while the rest went to the United States.378 The World Court decision was an attempt to resolve a protracted twenty-year dispute between the United States and Canada. 79 Both countries acceded to

Court jurisdiction in 1979380 and agreed to abide by its ruling.3 81

Besides being the site of productive fishing waters, the Georges

3 82
Bank contains a potentially large source of oil and natural gas.

United States Geographical Survey analysts estimate the bank could

hold 1.5 billion barrels of oil and 12.2 trillion cubic feet of natural
gas. 8 3 Nevertheless, the
few holes drilled in the underwater plateau
3 84

have discovered no oil.

The United States argued that the International Court of Justice

should give the entire Georges Bank area to the United States. 385
The United States based this claim on the contention that American

fishermen discovered and developed the bank.3 6 Canada asked, however, for just over a third of the bank. 3 7 Canada considers fishing
375. The Times (London), Dec. 17, 1983, at 6, col. 6.
376. L.A. Times, Oct. 13, 1984, at 13, col. 1.
377. Id.
378. Id. The Canadian share of the bank may be closer to one-fourth, and it apparently contains the most productive fishing waters. N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1984, at Al,
col. 2.
379. L.A. Times, Oct. 13, 1984, at 13, col. 1. The controversy arose in 1964 when
Canada issued oil and gas exploration permits in the Georges Bank area. Id. at col. 3.
Additionally, in the 1960's, Canadians began to fish the bank for the first time. Americans, on the other hand, have fished in the disputed area since the 1820's. N.Y. Times,
May 5, 1984, at A2, col. 5.
380. Submission by the United States to World Court authority stands in sharp
contrast to a United States attempt to preempt Court jurisdiction over the United StatesNicaragua embroglio. See notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
381. L.A. Times, Oct. 13, 1984, at 13, col. 1.
382. Id.
383. Id. at col. 2-3.
384. N.Y. Times, May 5, 1984, at A2, col. 5.
385. L.A. Times, Oct. 13, 1984, at 13, col. 1.
386. Id. See supra note 379.
387. L.A. Times, Oct. 13, 1984, at 13, col. 1.

rights on the bank to be of critical importance because about 3,700
jobs in Nova Scotia depend on the fishing resources of the bank. 88'
The World Court ruling drew a line through the Gulf of Maine
beginning about thirty miles off the northeastern coast of Maine and
ending about 180 miles southeast of Cape Cod, Massachusetts.3 89
This division, considered a compromise, gave each country about
one-half of what each wanted in the disputed area. 390 Moreover, the
decision may serve as precedent for resolving other maritime border
disagreements between the United States and Canada. 91
CONCLUSION

In 1984, interference with rights of free navigation dominated developments in the law of the sea. Work continued, albeit in a low
key, pursuant to the law of the sea treaty, with the issue of pioneer
investment in deep seabed mining being the cynosure of the Preparatory Commission meeting. Efforts to combat oceanic pollution continued on both a global and regional level. The International Whaling Commission lowered whaling quotas for 1985 in anticipation of a
total ban on commercial whaling in 1986. Finally, the International
Court of Justice delivered an important decision resolving a CanadaUnited States ocean boundary controversy. This ruling demonstrates
the largely untapped possibilities of using international law and a
supranational tribunal to achieve positive
results in solving a prob3 92
lem related to the marine environment.
JOHN A. CLEMONS

388. Id; see also N.Y. Times, May 5, 1984, at A2, col. 3.
389. L.A. Times, Oct. 13, 1984, at 13, col. 3.
390. Id. at col. 1. A senior United States official stated that neither side obtained
what it wanted and that the World Court rejected most of the arguments of both sides.
Id. New England fishermen were extremely upset by the decision, saying it took away
waters that they had fished for years. N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1984, at 1, col. 1 and at 9,
col. 2-4. The decision of the Court will probably force many American fishermen out of
business. About 2000 New England Fishermen will have to shift their fishing operations.
Id. at 9, col. 3.
391. N.Y. Times, May 5, 1984, at A2, col. 3. Currently, Canada and the United
States dispute all four of their maritime boundaries: Maine-New Brunswick, Washington-British Columbia, Alaska-British Columbia, and Alaska-Yukon. Id.
392. Dr. Arvid Pardo views the World Court ruling far less optimistically. He perceives it as an example of the continuing propensity of the International Court of Justice
to sacrifice legal principle to "political and pragmatic considerations." Letter from Dr.
Arvid Pardo to John A. Clemons (November 19, 1984). Dr. Pardo believes that this
ruling is cause for concern because the World Court is contributing support to a trend
that is "rapidly" extinguishing "the relevance of legal principles in cases of delimitation
of marine areas between States opposite or adjacent to each other." Id.

